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Abstract
This paper analyzes the short-run dynamics and changing sources of wealth among the
Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest individuals in the United States, using annual data for 12
years spanning before and after the financial crisis of 2008-9. Over the entire time period the
growth of wealth was negatively related to the previous years’ wealth when controlling for
individual characteristics, implying some conditional convergence of wealth within the group.
We find that the overall growth of the group’s wealth slowed after the crisis but stayed well
above the GDP growth rate. Considering the interaction of growth of wealth with personal
characteristics, we find that those who can be classified as self-made had a higher average
wealth growth rate than their counterparts, although this lead narrowed after the financial
crisis, during the Great Recession. Similarly, those with advanced degrees also had higher
average growth of wealth in the pre-crisis period. We also examine the mobility of in and
out of the Forbes 400, and find that turnover was higher in the period prior to the financial
crisis, particularly for self-made individuals and those with advanced degrees. The self-made
were also more likely to rise in rank within the Forbes 400 conditional on persisting in the
list. By employing an innovative method of dealing with selection bias in a truncated panel,
we are able to ascertain that our results are not driven by these biases. We also find some
differences in these patterns at the sectoral level, compared to the aggregate group.
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1 Introduction
Recent trends in income and wealth distributions in advanced economies, as well as work by
economists (e.g., Piketty (2014)) have refocused attention on increasing economic inequality.
An important aspect of this issue is the extreme inequality of wealth in America, evidenced
by the status of a few hundred individuals annually listed in the Forbes 400 ranking of the
country’s wealthiest people.1 This number makes up about 0.0003 percent of the number of
US households, and therefore a tiny fraction of the top 1 percent of households by wealth,
but their individual and aggregate wealth gives them salience in many ways.2 One important
conceptual issue in determining social attitudes to such extreme wealth is the question of
how that wealth was generated, and how it has evolved. Recent work has examined the
roles played by inheritance, innovation, technology, and education in the process of wealth
generation, and has stressed the importance of human capital and technological change. This
paper extends such work, to examine further the proposition that technological progress has
become a more important driver of new wealth creation over the last decade-and-a-half. The
paper also examines the impact of business cycle effects, as captured in differences in the
characteristics of this extreme group before and after the financial crisis, to provide a new
understanding of the short-run dynamics of extreme wealth in America.
A methodological contribution of this paper is to provide the first econometric analysis (of
which we are aware) of panel data constructed from the Forbes 400 annual lists. Econometric
analysis through panel regressions allows us to identify business cycle effects, as well as
their interaction with the individual characteristics of those in the list, including age, being
“self-made” and educational attainment in the form of advanced university degrees. We
also analyze the persistence of individuals in the list, how the list changes over time, and
how these changes are related to individual characteristics such as education. We employ
a recent econometric innovation to estimate the covariation of wealth with time-invariant
characteristics, such as educational attainment, while accounting for the intermittent absence
of some individuals from the list due to the rank cutoff. This issue of truncation in the panel
is handled with panel data techniques developed to tackle the problem of selection bias, which
was made well-known by Heckman (1979).
Several authors have previously used the Forbes 400 data to examine aspects of economic
inequality in the United States. For example, Piketty (2014) focuses on increasing global
inequality in income and wealth, but for the US specifically, he uses the Forbes 400 list to
document increasing wealth concentration over the prior three decades. According to the list,
the share of billionaires wealth rose dramatically, from 0.4 percent in 1987 to 1.5 percent in
2012 (Piketty 2014, 432–36). Also for the US, Saez and Zucman (2016) show that wealth
inequality has increased considerably at the top of the distribution over the last three decades,
but this conclusion is based on wealth estimates constructed from broader administrative
1This data source and the data are described in detail in Section 3. As detailed later, the share of these
400 individuals in aggregate national household wealth has been increasing dramatically.
2For example, individuals such as Jeff Bezos of Amazon, or families such as the Waltons of Walmart,
figure prominently in some political campaigns that seek to highlight economic inequality in the US, and the
political influence of other extremely wealthy individuals is sometimes viewed with concern.
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income data. A similar conclusion is reached in another study using the Forbes 400 data by
Kaplan and Rauh (2013a). That analysis, which is closest to the current paper in scope, use
the data at 10 year intervals, from 1982 to 2011, to examine the characteristics of individuals
in this set of the extremely wealthy. The authors find that, over this period, the percentage of
the Forbes 400 that inherited wealth declined, and that more of those on the list had a college
education. Their analysis shows that the Forbes 400 were more likely to be in technology,
finance or mass retailing, in 2011 as compared to 1982. Our approach differs from that of
Kaplan and Rauh in using annual data, allowing us to examine short run changes and business
cycle effects, the latter especially on either side of the financial crisis. The annual data
also allows us to explore short-term mobility and persistence of membership in the Forbes 400.3
Our analysis of turnover or mobility over recent years, and its relation to the business cycle,
is also quite different than the approach of Arnott, Bernstein and Wu (2015). Those authors
estimate that the wealth of the individuals in the Forbes 400 rose from 13,800 times US per
capita GDP in 1982 to 108,000 times US per capita GDP in 2014, but they mostly emphasize
the long run turnover in the list, “Instead, we find huge turnover in the names on the list: only
34 names on the inaugural 1982 list remain on the 2014 list, and only 24 names have appeared
on all 33 lists.” Of course, some of this turnover is the result of mortality. Therefor, allowing
for inheritance, the authors go on to estimate that only 39 percent of the wealth of the
original 1982 Forbes 400 list is represented in the 2014 list, so that 61 percent is “new money.”
However, this neglects the wealth that does not show up on the list, so that it could be that
some of that “new money” existed before those individuals made it on to the list4. Arnott et
al. therefore argue that dynastic wealth is less important than entrepreneurial wealth, both
over the period of the three decades of existence of the Forbes 400 list, as well as over longer
periods,5 but, unlike Kaplan and Rauh, they do not provide any quantitative analysis of the
sources of new wealth. While our analysis is more short term, and we cannot shed as much
light on longer run phenomena in the generation of large fortunes, it is arguable that focusing
just on recent years provides a more relevant picture of the current dynamics of extreme wealth.
In the next section, we provide a detailed overview of the Forbes 400 data used in this
paper. We first confirm and extend the results of Klass, Biham, Levy, Malcai and Solomon
(2006) and Nagayama (2013) that show increasing wealth inequality even among this group of
the very richest Americans. Then, we document trends in the number of the Forbes 400 with
advanced degrees of any kind (master’s, doctorates and professional degrees). This analysis
extends the focus of Kaplan and Rauh (2013a), which examines the increased presence of
college graduates among the group. We show that the number of those with advanced degrees
does not follow a smooth trend in our sample period. In fact, the financial crisis falls roughly
in the middle of our sample period, and there appear to be differences in pre- and post-crisis
trends of the numbers of those with advanced degrees, those who are self-made (defined in
3The general literature on wealth inequality is large, and includes, for example, the early analysis of
Thurow (1971), as well as more recent contributions such as Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2013),
Kaplan and Rauh (2013b), Wolff and Gittleman (2014), and DeNardi (2016).
4Thus, Donald Trump was wealthy before he made it on to the Forbes 400, so not all of his fortune once
he appeared on the list was “new money”.
5For earlier periods, they use figures constructed by Phillips (2002).
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the next section) and in the relative presence of individuals whose fortunes are attributable to
particular sectors. As one example of such sectoral differences, the share of wealth associated
with real estate rises rapidly duing the boom period of the first part of the sample, and falls
after the financial crisis, while the wealth share of technology and telecom as a sector has the
opposite pattern. Several such aspects of the data are discussed in the data overview sec-
tion, and we believe this kind of analysis has not been conducted previously for the Forbes 400.
After our description and preliminary analysis of the characteristics of the sample, our
focus in the subsequent section turns to a consideration of mobility, both in terms of position
within the Forbes 400, and in terms of entry and exit. We document changes in entry and exit
over the sample period, including differences in these patterns before and after the financial
crisis (boom vs. recession). We distinguish differences in patterns for those with and without
advanced degrees, and also consider annual patterns of entry, including those who are new
entrants, those who are self-made, and those who have both or neither characteristic. This
analysis can be seen as complementing that of Arnott et al. (2015), since we examine more
recent data, and are able to discuss features of the data that they are not in a position to
examine, such as what happens to individuals with advanced university degrees. Broadly, the
rates of attrition and persistence in our 12 year period are similar to those documented by
Arnott et al. (2015) over their sample of about three decades, although we must repeat the
caveat that those dropping out of the list are most unlikely to be moving into poverty!6 In
this section, we also provide a regression analysis of persistence in the Forbes 400 list, which
is an innovation over previous examinations of persistence.
Our investigation is rounded out by an econometric analysis of our panel data, using
the growth rate of wealth as the dependent variable, and allowing for a range of possible
specification issues. In particular, we adapt the method of Kripfganz and Schwarz (2013)
to deal with non-normality and time-invariant characteristics. Furthermore, we innovate
in simultaneously dealing with truncation through an implementation of the Semykina and
Wooldridge (2010) correction for selection bias for panel data in the presence of endogeneity.
Our results for the overall panel suggest mild wealth convergence among the group, business
cycle effects in terms of the GDP growth rate, and also some additional positive boom-year
impacts of being self-made and having an advanced degree. However, these results are not
always robust to disaggregation by sectors, which suggests that wealth dynamics are quite
complex, partly as a result of different sectors having different sensitivity to the business
cycle, and to the overlay of longer term trends. In particular, the technology and telecom
sector differs in these patterns from the finance sector. We hope our analysis will point the
way to further investigation of these complex dynamics at the extreme top of the wealth
distribution.
6The title of their paper is provocative in this respect, beginning with ”The Rich get Poorer.”
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2 Data Overview
As noted in the introduction, we use annual data taken from Forbes magazine, which lists
and ranks the magazine’s determination of the 400 richest persons in the United States of
America. This list appears in October every year, and we have compiled data manually for a
dozen years, from 2004 to 2015. There are 722 individuals who appear at least once in the
Forbes list over these 12 years. Some information, namely wealth and rank, of these persons
is only available if they are in the list for the year in question: thus, we have only 4800
observations out of a potential 8664 (722x12) observations. There are other variables that are
invariant over time, such as gender, education, and whether the individual was “self-made”,
in a sense to be made precise later in the paper. In some cases, more than one individual
may be listed in one of the 400 positions (e.g., a couple may be listed together), and we
treat these cases as one individual or observation, using the characteristics of the member
of the couple or family group that we identify as the “main” wealth generator. There is a
relatively small number of such cases, and our results are robust to their exclusion. To help
envision the scale of wealth of this group, note that the group’s aggregate wealth grew in
nominal terms from just under $ 1 trillion in 2004 to about $ 2.3 trillion in 2015, and this
represented close to a 50 percent increase in the share of this group in aggregate national
household wealth over that period. 7
Data on education, one of our main characteristics of interest, is not consistently available
in the Forbes 400 lists, and we have compiled the data on education manually from a variety
of sources, including Forbes magazine itself when possible. In some cases, the information
was not available or reliable, and so our annual totals do not always equal 400, because we
omit such observations. Of course, many individuals appear repeatedly in the list, and, as
noted, there are a total of 722 distinct individuals in our 12-year data set. When individuals
for whom we were not able to reliably determine their education levels are excluded, our
analysis is based on a remaining sample of 696 distinct individuals.
Since data on each individual’s wealth in a particular year is only available if they happen
to be in the top 400 in that year, observations for some individuals are not available for all
12 years: they may enter or drop out of the list one or more times. This particular kind of
truncation in our panel is an important issue that we will deal with in our empirical analysis,
since it may lead to selection bias.
In the rest of this section, we describe the data and its properties in some detail, high-
lighting some of the features and patterns that can be observed. This exploratory data
analysis provides some motivation for the subsequent formal analysis. We explore individual
characteristics such as age in the first year of our sample, having an advanced degree (anything
beyond a bachelor’s degree), the sector that is the source of wealth, being “self-made”, and
being a new entrant.
7This calculation is based on data on the net worth of US households reported by the US Federal REserve
Board of Governors.
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2.1 Wealth Inequality among the Wealthiest
We begin with a description of the distribution of wealth among the Forbes 400. It is standard
to use a Pareto function to model this distribution at the very top end of the wealth spectrum.
Using this model, Klass et al. (2006) demonstrated increasing wealth inequality at the very
top, for the period 1988 to 2003. Nagayama (2013) extended this type of analysis to 2012,
and we provide a similar analysis for our sample period, which extends to 2015.8
The model uses a Pareto function connecting wealth to rank, as follows:
WR = AR
− 1
α .
Here, WR stands for the wealth (in current USD), while R is the rank of that person.
Taking a log transformation on both sides, we get:
log WR = log A− 1
α
log R.
=⇒ log R = α log A− α log WR.
We plot the log transformation of rank vs. wealth for the first and last years of our sample
in the top part of Figure 1. The α is estimated as the slope of the fitted least-squares line,
and reported below the scatter plots. A lower (higher) α indicates more (less) inequality in
the distribution.
In Figure 1, the scatter plot shifts to the right over the period, which reflects increasing
nominal wealth. The relative slopes are not apparent from the plots, but the estimated α,
as reported in the lower box, did decrease, implying increased inequality over the sample
period, consistent with the earlier results of Klass et al. and Nagayama. The lower part of
Figure 1 repeats the exercise for the years 2007 and 2013. The estimated α in these two
years demonstrates that the increase in wealth inequality within the Forbes 400 was higher
in this sub-period than for the entire sample period: indeed, the change was in the opposite
direction at the beginning and end of the sample period.
This effect can also be seen in Figure 2, which plots the estimated α for each year of the
sample. From 2004-2007 there was a slight reduction in the inequality of wealth among this
rarefied set of the extremely wealthy, but post-crisis the inequality measure increased every
year till 2013. In the last two years of the sample the trend did reverse. Later in the paper we
explore some of the underlying characteristics of those who make up these distributions, how
their wealth changed over the sample period, and what kind of turnover there was in the compo-
sition of the sample over the years. We will find that, controlling for individual characteristics
and economic environment, there was slight convergence in the wealth levels of the Forbes 400.
8For a novel analysis of the economic mechanisms generating the Pareto distribution, see Jones (2015).
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Figure 1: Forbes 400 Rank vs. Curr. Wealth in Log-Log Scale
7
Figure 2: Time Series of α, 2004-2015
2.2 Advanced Degrees
As discussed in the introduction, one of the characteristics we examine is the importance of
education in this sample of the extremely wealthy. Kaplan and Rauh (2013a) had documented
the increased number of the Forbes 400 with college degrees over a period of three decades. We
examine our more recent data for the possible importance of education beyond the bachelor’s
level, i.e., advanced degrees of any type. US data (Table 1) shows that the earlier US trend
of increasing proportions of college graduates has recently been reinforced by acquisition of
graduate or advanced degrees (i.e., masters, professional, and doctoral degrees of any kind)
at a higher rate as well.
Whereas the national data displays a relatively steady increase in the total numbers
(about 700,000 per year) and percent (about 0.22 percentage points per year) of the US
population with advanced degrees from 2000 to 2015, the pattern of change in the Forbes
400 is different. The left panel of Figure 3 shows a sizable increase in the number of listed
individuals with advanced degrees from 2004 to 2007, but the number levels off and even
declines slightly thereafter. The percentage of such individuals in the Forbes 400 goes from
about 35 percent in 2004 to 42 percent in 2007, or almost a 20 percent increase in the
proportion. This is much more rapid than the national trend in acquisition of advanced
degrees. The right panel in Figure 3 illustrates a similar pattern over time, but in terms of
the fraction of wealth among the Forbes 400 held by those with advanced degrees, rather
than number of individuals. The fraction of wealth levels off, but does not decline from the
2007 peak in the way that the number of individuals does. This suggests that the individu-
als with advanced degrees who remainin in the Forbes 400 are doing relatively better after 2007.
Next, Figure 4 plots the mean and median wealth for individuals in the Forbes 400, with
and without an advanced degree, by year. Since the distribution of wealth among the Forbes
400 is itself very skewed (a small number of exceptionally wealthy individuals among the
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mere billionaires), the mean is greater than the median for both groups. For those with
an advanced degree, after 2008, the mean becomes higher than that for their less educated
counterparts. On the other hand, the median for the more educated stays slightly lower
than the median for the less educated group. This implies that the wealthier individuals
with advanced degrees are driving the comparative effects. This is consistent with the earlier
comparison in Figure 3.
Table 1: Number and Percent of US Population 25 and Over with Advanced Degrees
Year Number (’000s) Percent
2000 15,006 8.6
2001 15,728 8.7
2002 16,414 9.0
2003 17,169 9.3
2004 17,983 9.7
2005 18,121 9.6
2006 18,567 9.7
2007 19,184 9.9
2008 20,228 10.3
2009 20,938 10.6
2010 21,056 10.5
2011 22,057 10.9
2012 22,730 11.1
2013 23,931 11.6
2014 24,623 11.9
2015 25,445 12.0
Figure 3: Forbes 400 Individuals with Advanced Degrees
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Figure 4: Forbes 400 Wealth by Advanced Degrees
2.3 Sectors
We now describe the industries or sectors with which members of the Forbes 400 can be
associated, in terms of where their wealth was generated or resides. We use the classification
of sectors in the Forbes lists themselves, with some small modifications, and largely are able
to assign individuals to their respective sectors based on the information in the lists. Recall
that Kaplan and Rauh (2013a) found, going from 1982 to 2011, that there were increased
numbers in three sectors Finance, Technology and Retailing.
Table 2 lists the classification of sectors we are using in this analysis, ranked by the number
of unique individuals in each sector. It also reports the percentage with advanced degrees for
each sector. It is indeed the case that Finance and Technology (including Telecoms) have
the highest representation in the sample of individuals. Retail comes further down the list
in terms of numbers. Interestingly, manufacturing is slightly more common as the sector of
these extremely wealthy individuals, compared to several service sectors, though not when
compared to services as a whole. Note that in our classification, which follows that of Forbes
magazine, Diversified Investments and Inheritance are not sectors in the sense of type of
economic activity, but represent how the wealth was acquired, or where it is invested. There
are some clear, and mostly obvious patterns with respect to the sectors in which individuals
with advanced degrees are more likely to be found. Compared to the sample average, these
sectors are Finance, Technology and Telecom, Healthcare and Medicine, and Diversified
Investments.
While Table 2 provides counts of individuals who are in the sample at least once over the
whole 12 year period, Figure 5 shows how the proportion of wealth of the 400 held within each
sector or sector changes over the sample period. Correspondingly, Figure 6 shows how the
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number of individuals in each sector changes over the sample period. In order to highlight the
impact of the financial crisis on trends in the concentration of wealth, these figures include
linear fits for 2004-08 and 2010-15, with 2009 not included in either sub-period. This choice
is also based on the direct observation from the plots that the most marked changes are
around 2009. While the differences in trends before and after 2009 and across sectors may
not be fully reflective of what was happening in each sector, they are still useful in suggesting
further investigations about the structure of the economy and how it responds to business
cycles. Perhaps the most obvious feature of these plots is the real estate boom that occurred
prior to the financial crisis and recession. Finance, Diversified Investments, and Hospitality
also share some of this feature. Unlike the longer term trends noted by Kaplan and Rauh,
considering annual data on either side of a major turning point in the economy provides
insight into cyclical factors rather than longer run trends.
Table 2: Unique Individuals and Education by Sector
Adv. Deg. (%) Self-Made (%)
Source of wealth No. Yes No Yes No Total
Finance 109 49.5 50.5 88.1 11.9 100.0
Technology Telecom 107 49.5 50.5 89.7 10.3 100.0
Diversified Investments 70 67.1 32.9 72.9 27.1 100.0
Manufacturing 55 29.1 70.9 54.5 45.5 100.0
Real Estate and Construction 54 33.3 66.7 79.6 20.4 100.0
Oil and Metals 44 29.5 70.5 59.1 40.9 100.0
Retail 42 16.7 83.3 64.3 35.7 100.0
Media 41 26.8 73.2 61.0 39.0 100.0
Food and Beverage 36 13.9 86.1 55.6 44.4 100.0
Other Services 32 21.9 78.1 68.8 31.3 100.0
Healthcare and Medicine 30 53.3 46.7 86.7 13.3 100.0
Hospitality 27 25.9 74.1 37.0 63.0 100.0
Sports 25 36 64 72.0 28.0 100.0
Agriculture 16 18.8 81.3 43.8 56.3 100.0
Inheritance 8 37.5 62.5 0.0 100.0 100.0
Overall 696 38.6 61.4 71.4 28.6 100.0
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Figure 5: Share of Sector∗ in the Total Wealth of the 400
Linear Fit - Before 2009, After 2009
∗The Agriculture sector is not displayed, since there is no one in this sector for certain years.
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Figure 6: No. of Individuals by Sector∗
Linear Fit - Before 2009, After 2009
∗The Agriculture sector is not displayed, since there is no one in this sector for certain years.
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2.4 Being “Self-Made”
An important aspect of American ideology (or mythology) is the notion that anyone can
become successful through their own efforts. The main argument of Arnott et al. (2015) is
that inherited wealth dissipates relatively rapidly, and that most of the large fortunes we see
at present have been created in the recent past.
In line with the conceptual importance of personal success versus inheritance, the Forbes
list reports a “self-made” score on a scale of 1-10. The scoring system is described in detail in
a Forbes Magazine article by Fontevecchia (2014). The scoring uses information on whether,
and to what extent, individuals were the beneficiaries of substantial inherited wealth. Of
course, this does not distinguish among those who might still have come from wealthy or
educated families, those from comfortable backgrounds (e.g., “upper middle class”), and
those who may have started without any advantages in their socio-economic background.
We use a simpler version of the Forbes score, a binary variable which takes the value 1 for
anyone with the score 6 or more, and 0 for others. By this classification, of the 696 unique
individuals, there are 497 who are self-made and 199 who are not. Note that the number of
individuals who are not self-made by this measure is larger than the number of individuals
whose wealth is attributed prinarily to inheritance, in Table 2. Using our definition, as shown
in the upper left panel of Figure 7, the annual proportion of the self-made in the Forbes list is
high and it increased slightly over the dozen years of our sample. The increase coincided with
the boom years prior to the financial crisis. The proportion stabilized at around 70% from
2009 on. The share in wealth of the self-made relative to the total wealth of the Forbes 400
displays a similar pattern, in the upper right panel, leveling at about 65% since 2009. The
lower share of wealth as compared to the share of individuals reflects the fact that self-made
individuals were slightly less wealthy on average than others in the list.
The pattern of increase in the first years of our sample, and stabilization thereafter, in the
number of the self-made in the Forbes 400 is similar to that of the subset holding advanced
degrees, as shown in the lower panels of Figure 7. In fact, self-made individuals are somewhat
more likely to hold an advanced degree: among the 497 unique self-made individuals in the
panel, 41% hold an advanced degree, while among the not self-made 199, only 32% do. The
lower panel in Figure 7 divides the self-made into the two groups, those holding advanced
degrees and others, and plots them separately. This figure shows that much of the increase
in the number and share in wealth of the self-made in the early part of the sample is due to
an increase in the number of the self-made who have advanced degrees.
Table 2 shows the proportion of self-made individuals by sector. As might be expected,
human-capital intensive industries with likely low barriers to entry, such as Finance and
Technology, have the highest rates of self-made wealthy individuals, while more capital
intensive industries such as Hospitality and Agriculture have less than 50%.
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Figure 7: “Self-Made” Shares over Time
Note: Flexible fit - best-fitting fractional polynomial after estimating many functional forms for y = g(x),
where the powers of g(x) are searched in the range (-2, -1, -.5, 0, .5, 1, 2, 3).
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2.5 Age
There are two perspectives we can take on age, which is calculated from the reported year of
birth for each individual. We can look at the age profile of the individuals in our sample,
irrespective of which years they appear in the list, and we can also examine the age profile
of each year’s list. The connection between the two depends on entry and exit, which is
discussed in the next section. For example, a simple t-test over unique individuals shows that
the younger individuals are more likely to have advanced degrees, and this can be related
to the increased presence of the latter characteristic over the first years of the sample. The
source of year of birth is the Forbes list, or other news articles where needed.
Figure 8 relates being self-made to the year of birth, rounded to the nearest 5 years. The
fraction of unique individuals who are self-made, calculated for each 5-year interval, tends to
be higher among younger individuals, although there is considerable variation around the
line of best fit.
In Figure 9, we plot the proportion of unique individuals with advanced degrees by year
of birth. Among those born up until 1970, we see a steady increase in the fraction with
advanced degrees, This pattern reverses for the younger cohorts in our sample of individuals.
To check whether there was a difference between the self-made and others in this regard, we
plotted the fraction of those with advanced degrees separately for the self-made and for others
in the right panel. The difference between the self-made and others is quite pronounced. For
the self-made, the pattern is quite similar to the whole sample. The reversal for younger
cohorts is now clearly attributed to them: those not self-made are all born before 1980. There
is a large increase in the proportion with advanced degrees in the younger cohorts among
those who are not self-made.
Next, we turn to the second perspective on age, by examining the age profile of individuals
in each of the annual lists. The 400 does not age all that much over the sample period (see
Figure 10). The group with advanced degrees is younger than their less educated counterparts,
but the average age of this group increases slightly faster than their counterparts. This could
be due to the mobility of those with advanced degrees, if they persist longer in the list before
dropping off; but more likely this is due to the fact that there is an influx of new entrants
without advanced degrees. The right hand panel of the figure displays a different pattern
for new entrants: their average age declines over the sample period, though there is again
convergence in the average age of those with and without advanced degrees.
Turning to the age profile of just the self-made over the sample period, in Figure 11, one
sees that the average age of the self-made is increasing at about the same rate as for the
overall sample, shown in the previous figure. The differences between those with and without
advanced degrees for the self-made subsample are fairly similar to those in the whole sample.
This similarity also hold for new entrants, as shown in the right hand panel of the figure.
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Figure 8: Year of Birth and Self-Made
Figure 9: Year of Birth and Advanced Degrees
Note: Flexible fit - best-fitting fractional polynomial after estimating many functional forms for y = g(x),
where the powers of g(x) are searched in the range (-2, -1, -.5, 0, .5, 1, 2, 3).
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Figure 10: Average Age over Time
Figure 11: Average Age of the Self-Made over Time
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3 Mobility: Entry and Exit
In this section, we analyze mobility or turnover within the Forbes 400, an issue explored by
Arnott et al. (2015) in a somewhat different manner. While we have annual data, it is easier
to observe noticeable changes at periods longer than a year, so we divide our sample into
two periods, from 2004 to 2009, and 2009 to 2015. Thus, the two sub-periods are slightly
unequal in length. The first sub-period includes the years up to and including the financial
crisis, while the second period is one of slow recovery from the crisis. Our division of the
sample period allows us to examine possible business cycle effects in the process of turnover
among the Forbes 400.
3.1 New Entrants
Figure 12 provides different views of trends with respect to annual new entrants into the
Forbes 400 over the sample period. In the top panels, the left hand plot displays the fraction
of the Forbes 400 who are new entrants for each year. These vary considerably from one year
to the next, but the fitted lines on either side of 2009 suggest that entry goes down after the
financial crisis. The right-hand panel displays the proportion of the wealth of the Forbes
400 that is held by new entrants. This is smaller than the fraction of the 400 who are new
entrants because, on average, the new entrants are less wealthy than the rest. The fraction of
wealth does not seem to vary as much as the number of individuals.
The middle panels compare new entrants with and without advanced degrees. Interest-
ingly, after the financial crisis, the number of new entrants with advanced degrees trends
down, while the number without advanced degrees does not display this trend.
The bottom left panel plots the mean wealth for new entrants with and without advanced
degrees. The mean wealth of the former group is always lower than the mean wealth of the
latter group. The right hand panel displays the same patterns, but in this case for the per
person average proportion of total wealth in each group.
Table 3 extends the breakdown of new entrants to examine whether they are self-made
or not. Numbers are reported for each year. Most new entrants are self-made, but this is
especially true of the boom years earlier in the sample period. In parallel, the number of
self-made also increases in these boom years.
3.2 Turnover
Table 4 shows the pattern of turnover within the entire Forbes 400 for both the two chosen
sub-periods (2004-09 and 2009-15). The data are aggregated by quartile, so that we capture
movement between quartiles, as well as entry into and exit from the Forbes 400. Quartile 1
represents the richest quarter of individuals, quartile 2 the next richest group, and so on. The
numbers do not equal 100 for each quartile because of ties in estimated wealth, and there are
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Table 3: Number of New Entrants and Self-Made
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
New only 7 5 6 4 5 9 1 9 11 7 11
Self-Made only 214 224 217 236 237 244 255 255 253 255 253
Both 36 36 51 34 35 30 25 25 20 24 23
Neither 129 123 117 118 113 110 113 107 110 109 108
Total 386 388 391 392 390 393 394 396 394 395 395
also some missing observations, because we have omitted those for whom we do not have
education data. The table can be read as follows. There are 383 individuals included in 2004
(505 minus 122 who are not in the 2004 list). Out of these, 115 were no longer in the list in
2009 (the sum of the first column): 20 of them because of death. Out of the 101 in the top
quartile in 2004, 67 remained in that quartile in 2009. A total of 16 individuals dropped out
of the list entirely, over the five year period. On the other hand, as one would expect, erosion
was much higher at the lower end of the distribution: 50 out of 77 in the bottom quartile in
2004 had dropped out in 2009. Of the 107 individuals in the top quartile in 2009, 17 were
new entrants. The numbers of new entrants were much higher in the other three quartiles
(27, 43, 35). We can also observe movement within the list. Thus, 14 people went from the
top quartile in 2004 to the second quartile in 2009, whereas 17 people made the reverse move
between these years, climbing from quartile 2 to the top quartile. If we look at the bottom
half of Table 2, we can see similar patterns for the second sub-period, from 2009 to 2015.
Table 5 presents the data in an identical format, but restricted to individuals with ad-
vanced degrees. In 2004, 142 (202 minus 60 in the final column) of the 383 individuals
included in Table 4 had advanced degrees. The number with advanced degrees in 2009 was
somewhat higher, at 164 (202 minus 38). There was a net increase of 22 in the number of
individuals with advanced degrees in the Forbes 400 list, with 60 entering and 38 leaving.
Since 3 exits were due to death, if we exclude these from the exit count, there was a net
increase of 25 individuals with advanced degrees. This pattern was not replicated in the
second sub-period, after the financial crisis. There was a net decrease of 3 in the later period:
42 individuals entering and 45 leaving (6 due to death, implying a net increase of 3 excluding
those cases)the list between 2009 and 2015. The numbers who dropped out because of death
were relatively small, so most of the turnover was from other causes.
In Table 6, we present the same data for the remainder of the list, those without an
advanced degree. This designation therefore lumps together college graduates and those
without college degrees. We can see that among this subset, there is very small net addition in
the first sub-period of 2 people, if deaths are excluded (62 minus 77, adjusted for 17 deaths).
But in the second sub period there is an appreciable addition of 35 (82 minus 74, adjusted
for 27 deaths).
Comparing the groups with and without advanced degrees, the patterns of turnover are
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Table 4: Transition Matrix, All Individuals
Quartile in 2009
Quartile in 2004 Not in the list 1 2 3 4 Total
Not in the list 0 17 27 43 35 122
1 16 67 14 2 2 101
2 14 17 27 29 10 97
3 35 2 16 29 26 108
4 50 4 8 8 7 77
Total 115 107 92 111 80 505
Quartile in 2015
Quartile in 2009 Not in the list 1 2 3 4 Total
Not in the list 0 12 31 35 46 124
1 14 73 11 9 0 107
2 14 13 27 27 11 92
3 38 6 20 24 23 111
4 53 1 6 7 13 80
Total 119 105 95 102 93 514
Between 2005 and 2009, 20 were dropped from the list after their death.
Between 2009 and 2015, 33 were dropped from the list after their death.
fairly similar for each of the two sub-periods. However, the proportion dropping out due to
death is quite a bit higher among those without advanced degrees.
The most notable feature of the comparisons across level of education for each sub-period
is that the period 2004-09 is different, because the number of individuals with advanced
degrees increases over those years. But whether this is a transitory phenomenon, or a specific
feature of the business cycle of that time, or something that reflects underlying trends in the
relationship between higher education and extreme wealth (extending Kaplan and Rauhs
observations) cannot be determined with this sample. These possibilities certainly deserve
further investigation.
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Table 5: Transition Matrix, Individuals with Advanced Degrees
Quartile in 2009
Quartile in 2004 Not in the list 1 2 3 4 Total
Not in the list 0 8 15 20 17 60
1 5 26 3 2 1 37
2 5 9 10 12 6 42
3 10 1 6 9 8 34
4 18 1 5 3 2 29
Total 38 45 39 46 34 202
Quartile in 2015
Quartile in 2009 Not in the list 1 2 3 4 Total
Not in the list 0 3 9 16 14 42
1 3 33 6 3 0 45
2 7 7 6 13 6 39
3 13 3 7 12 11 46
4 22 1 2 3 6 34
Total 45 47 30 47 37 206
Between 2005 and 2009, 3 were dropped from the list after their death.
Between 2009 and 2015, 6 were dropped from the list after their death.
Table 6: Transition Matrix, Individuals without Advanced Degrees
Quartile in 2009
Quartile in 2004 Not in the list 1 2 3 4 Total
Not in the list 0 9 12 23 18 62
1 11 41 11 0 1 64
2 9 8 17 17 4 55
3 25 1 10 20 18 74
4 32 3 3 5 5 48
Total 77 62 53 65 46 303
Quartile in 2015
Quartile in 2009 Not in the list 1 2 3 4 Total
Not in the list 0 9 22 19 32 82
1 11 40 5 6 0 62
2 7 6 21 14 5 53
3 25 3 13 12 12 65
4 31 0 4 4 7 46
Total 74 58 65 55 56 308
Between 2005 and 2009, 17 were dropped from the list after their death.
Between 2009 and 2015, 27 were dropped from the list after their death.
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Figure 12: New Entrants over Time
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3.3 Keeping Wealth: Mobility Regressions
Table 7 presents the results of regressions to test the hypothesis that persistence in the list is
related to having an advanced degree or being self-made.
In the first two columns, the observations are the 696 unique individuals, for whom we
have education data. The dependent variable is the number of times each individual appears
on the list in the 12 year period 2004-2015. The right hand side variable of interest is a
dummy variable for whether the individual has an advanced degree. Column 1 reports the
results of a simple regression, while column 2 controls for age as well as sector and year fixed
effects. In either case, those who have advanced degrees appear significantly more often than
those who do not, while self-made individuals appear less often.
In the next two columns the dependent variable is the probability of persisting in the list
after being in it the previous year. In all these regressions we account for persons who have
been dropped from the list after their death by including a dummy for being deceased as an
explanatory variable.
Specifically, in columns 3 and 4, if a person was on the list in 2004, and is still the list in
2005, Stay assumes the value 1 for 2005. If the person is not on the list any more, Stay takes
the value 0. If a person was not on the list in the previous year, the value is unassigned. The
variable Stay cannot be estimated for the year 2004.9
In columns 5 and 6, we present a test of the hypothesis that the self-made or persons
with advanced degrees improved their ranks more than their counterparts without advanced
degrees. The dependent variable is a dummy for improvement of rank, which we explain
with an example. Suppose a person appears in the list in the previous year, say 2004 at a
rank say 100. If in the next year, 2005, their rank is below 100 the dummy takes the value 1.
If they stay at the same rank or drop below 100 or drop out, the dummy takes the value
0. If a person is not in the list in the initial year (2004 in our example), the value for the
dummy is unassigned or ‘missing’. Like Stay, we can only estimate this variable for the years
2005-2015.
Since the dependent variables for these regressions are dummy variables we estimate panel
probit models with random effects. While persons with advanced degrees are significantly
more likely to appear on the list over the period of twelve years (columns 1 and 2), when
examined year-by-year, columns 3-6 show that the difference is not significant at the 5%
level. However, individuals with advanced degrees are more likely to improve their rank
within the list than their counterparts without advanced degrees. Regarding those who are
self-made, columns 3 and 4 confirm, as columns 1 and 2 suggested, that year after year being
self-made is associated with less persistence. However, those that do persist in the list, rise
up the ranks faster than those who are not self-made, thus being self-made is associated with
improvements of rank over time.
9Thus, the number of observation in the estimation panel is smaller than in the entire panel.
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Table 7: Persistence in the Forbes 400
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No. Times in the List Pr(Stay) Pr(Rank Improves)
Adv. Deg. 0.913∗∗ 0.846∗ 0.136 0.123 0.0745+ 0.0850∗
(0.323) (0.334) (0.0877) (0.0901) (0.0419) (0.0422)
Self-Made -1.012∗∗ -0.965∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗ -0.393∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.141∗∗
(0.348) (0.368) (0.0958) (0.101) (0.0449) (0.0465)
Deceased -0.407∗ -0.524∗∗ -0.148+ 0.0121
(0.160) (0.168) (0.0871) (0.0884)
Year of Birth Y Y Y
Sector-effect Y Y Y
Year-effect Y Y
Observations 696 696 4716 4716 4716 4716
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The results in column 1 - 2 are from OLS.
The dependent variable for regressions in column 1 and 2: No of times the person appears in the
list in the period 2004-15.
The results in column 3 - 6, are from a random-effects panel probit regression.
Column 3 and 4: The dependent variable is likelihood of staying in the list after being on it last
year.
Column 5 and 6: The dependent variable is likelihood of rising up the ranks after appearing in it
last year.
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4 Wealth Dynamics
In this section, we study the short run dynamics of the wealth of the members of the
Forbes 400 through panel regressions, controlling for characteristics of the individuals and
the economic environment, and thereby formalizing some of the data analysis earlier in the
paper. We begin by describing the general econometric approach to the problem. Then
we present the basic regression results. Next, we extend the analysis to take account of
possible estimation biases due to truncation, since some individuals drop out of the sample in
particular years because they no longer meet the ranking criterion for inclusion. Finally, we
consider specific sectors in isolation, to examine how different parts of the economy display
different dynamics of wealth within this sample.
4.1 Econometric Modeling Approach
As usual, the subscript i will indicate an individual and t the year. For example, Wit is wealth
of one person in a particular year, say, the wealth of Bill Gates in 2008. Lower case, wit,
represents the log of wealth. Information about whether a person is self-made, or their ed-
ucation level, does not change over time, so we drop t in such cases, Self-Madei and Adv. Degi.
The figure 13 shows the distribution of wealth (Wit), which is very skewed, as noted
earlier, and the log of wealth (wit). We will use the log transformation as the dependent
variable for the rest of the analysis.
Figure 13: Distribution of the Variables Wealth and log(Wealth), 2004-15
Smooth line is the normal distribution with same mean and deviation, for comparison
Let us say that wealth depends on an array of independent variables Xit, including
individual characteristics and indicators of economic conditions. In a panel of data, wealth in
one period will be heavily dependent on wealth in the previous period, as in the following
equation:
wit = β0 + β1wit−1 + β2Xit + uit (1)
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However, it is more useful to estimate the equation in terms of the change in log wealth,
which is the growth rate of wealth:
∆wit = β0 + β1wit−1 + β2Xit + uit. (2)
If we divide the variables Xit into those that are time-invariant – such as being self-made,
having advanced degrees, and sector – and those that are not, the above model can be
rewritten:
∆wit = β0 + β1Ui + β2Vit + uit. (3)
Generally, two kinds of methods are employed to estimate such a model, depending on
the assumptions: random-effects or fixed-effects (Wooldridge 2010).
Random-effects models assume that there are no individual related-effects in the panel,
and that all the unobserved characteristics are unrelated to the error term. In our case, this
assumption is likely to be violated: individuals have many characteristics that contribute to
wealth generation, other than the ones we can measure.
If there is a clear case for time-invariant individual effects in the panel, we can employ
fixed-effect methods, in which we essentially remove the time-invariant individual fixed effects.
This can be done by taking first differences, or alternatively by demeaning all the variables
(Arellano and Bond 1991). Subtracting the mean removes the time-invariant individual fixed
effects, so we will not be able to estimate the effect of time-invariant characteristics such as
having advanced degrees or being self-made.
There are, however, some hybrid models10 such as one proposed by Allison (2009) for
estimating the within-effects in the random-effects model. These could be suitable for our
analysis, other than the complication that we have time-persistence in our model. However,
one can modify these methods to deal with that complication.
In the hybrid method proposed by Allison, we can decompose the time-varying variables
into two parts: Vit − Vi and Vi. Our model 3 can then be rewritten as:
∆wit = β0 + β1Ui + β2(Vit − Vi) + β3Vi + uit.
=⇒ ∆wit = β0 + β1Ui + β2Vit + (β3 − β2)Vi + uit.
=⇒ ∆wit = β0 + β1Ui + β2Vit + β4Vi + uit.
For implementation, we would include the means of time-varying terms for each individual
as explanatory variables on the right-hand side and estimate this model with the random-
effects assumption:
∆wit = β0 + β
′
1U
′
i + β2Vit + uit. (4)
Where, U ′i = Ui + Vi.
10These are summarized by Schunck (2013).
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A further issue is that the panel data has AR(1) errors, and lagged wealth is an explanatory
variable, so the random-effects assumption that the error term uit is uncorrelated with
unobserved individual fixed-effects does not hold. To overcome this problem we implement
the hybrid model through a two stage method proposed by Kripfganz and Schwarz (2013).11
Very briefly, one estimates the GMM coefficients of the time-varying variables at the first
stage. At the second stage, residuals from the first-stage analysis are used to estimate the
coefficients of the time-invariant variables, with corrected standard errors.
4.2 Estimation Results
The results of the different regressions are displayed in Table 8. In each case, the dependent
variable is the growth rate of wealth, measured as the difference of log wealth. In all the
methods, the coefficient of lagged wealth is negative, indicating some degree of conditional
wealth convergence within the group. This is conditional convergence because we are con-
trolling for various other factors, and that also explains why this result is consistent with
the increasing within-group inequality documented in Section 2.1 (Figure 1). Also, in the
random effects and sequential Kripfganz-Schwarz methods, the magnitude of the coefficient of
conditional convergence is much smaller, and seems more plausible empirically. In general, as
one would expect, the results for the random effects and hybrid models are closer to those of
our preferred method, the two-stage or sequential K-S method, than the fixed effect estimates.
In all cases, the estimates display a strong business cycle effect, in that the GDP growth
rate has a large and significant effect on the growth rate of wealth. Indeed, a one percentage
point increase in the GDP growth rate translates into over 3 percentage points of growth in
the wealth of those in the Forbes 400. At the aggregate economy level, this should not be
surprising, although we will observe differences across sectors in disaggregated estimations in
section 4.4.
There are some additional differences in the period before the onset of the financial crisis.
Focusing on the results of the sequential K-S method, in column 4, the dummy associated
with the pre-crisis period is negative, but interactions of this dummy with indicators for
being self-made and having an advanced degree both have positive coefficients, which are also
similar in magnitude, and together outweigh the negative coefficient on the pre-crisis dummy
variable. In other words, this was a period in which individuals with these two characteristics
were doing better in terms of growth in wealth than their counterparts without advanced
degrees or those who were not self-made. However, the results for the second stage, in which
time-invariant effects are estimated, show that the positive impact of being self-made on the
growth of wealth continued after 2008, albeit at a much lower level than in the pre-crisis
period, while the impact of having an advanced degrees no longer was perceptible.
11The implementation is done in the package STATA, using the command xtseqreg developed by Kripfganz.
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Table 8: Growth in Wealth Full Panel Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Effects Random Effects Hybrid Sequential
K-S Method
First-stage Dependent variable is Log(Wealth)t - Log(Wealth)t−1
Method GLS GLS GLS GMM
Log(Wealth)t−1 -0.389∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005)
Before 2008 0.214∗∗∗ -0.023 -0.049∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Before 2008 × Self-made 0.016 0.022 0.028 0.040∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014)
Before 2008 × Advanced 0.007 0.041∗∗ 0.016 0.041∗∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016)
GDP growth rate 0.123 3.603∗∗∗ 3.018∗∗∗ 3.688∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.220) (0.211) (0.220)
Self-made 0.000 0.016∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(.) (0.009) (0.014)
Advanced 0.000 -0.002 0.010
(.) (0.008) (0.013)
Age 0.047∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.003 -0.004
(0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Age2 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean of Log(Wealth)t−1 0.299∗∗∗
(0.016)
Mean of Before 2008 -0.027
(0.040)
Mean of Before 2008 × Self-made -0.132∗∗∗
(0.041)
Mean of Before 2008 × Advanced -0.007
(0.040)
Mean of GDP growth rate 2.321∗∗
(0.995)
Constant -2.502∗∗∗ 1.382∗∗∗ 0.806 0.128
(0.293) (0.482) (0.506) (0.123)
Second-stage Dependent variable is residuals from the previous stage
Method GLS
Self-made 0.013∗∗
(0.006)
Advanced -0.001
(0.006)
Constant 0.011
(0.012)
Sector-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3900 3900 3900 3900
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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4.3 Dealing with Truncation
We also estimate a modified version of the two-stage Kripfganz method, which deals with the
truncation issue arising from the data being restricted to the 400 wealthiest individuals in
each year. Truncation leads to a potential selection bias, which is dealt with by methods
that can be traced back to Heckman (1979), involving estimation of inverse Mills ratios to
capture the effect of the selection bias. Of course, the original methodology was for simple
cross-sections, and dynamic panel data requires considerably more sophisticated estimation.
We follow Semykina and Wooldridge (2010),12 who provide a method for estimation of the
part of the error that is allowed to be systematically correlated with selection in a dynamic
panel with endogenous explanatory variables. With some simplifying assumptions, the result
of these correlations can be obtained and included in the primary equation to give consistent
estimates of the primary regression coefficients. These extra terms are the inverse Mills ratios.
Here, our innovation is to combine the methods of Semykina and Wooldridge (2010)
and Kripfganz and Schwarz (2013). First we estimate the inverse Mills ratios following the
technique of Semykina and Wooldridge (2010), and then we use these inverse Mills ratios as
an explanatory variable along with the other variables, using the implementation developed
by Kripfganz.
The results for the resulting modification of the sequential K-S method are presented in
the first column of Table 9. They are very similar to those in column 4 of Table 8, suggesting
that the truncation problem is not a serious one. However, we provide further estimates to
examine the robustness of the results to possible selection bias due to truncation. Column
2 of Table 9 applies the K-S method, but without the correction for selection, to a sample
restricted to individuals who are in the Forbes 400 for each of the 12 years. Hence, there
is no issue of individuals dropping out of this sub-sample in some years due to their rank
falling below 400. The results are broadly similar to those of the two-stage K-S method, with
and without the truncation correction.
Results of a further robustness check are reported in Table 10. Column 1 of the table
applies the K-S method to the top 300 of our sample, excluding data for those individuals
who remain in the top 400 in some years. Column 2 applies the selection correction to
this sub-sample, as was done for the full sample in Column 1 of Table 9. The next two
columns use the top 300 individuals, but we now include data for these individuals for years
in which their rank is between 301 and 400, since this data is available to us. The idea here
is that the truncation issue will be partially attenuated in this data set. Column 3 estimates
the regression using the 2-stage K-S method, and column 4 further applies the truncation
correction. Comparing across all four columns, we see that the impact of missing data is not
severe, and the truncation correction does not change the results appreciably.
12That paper also provides a review of various prior analyses of how to tackle selection biases in various
situations.
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Table 9: Full Panel Estimation Effect of Truncation
(1) (2) (3)
K-S Modified K-S K-S
Panel subset All Always in 400 Always in 300
First-stage Dependent variable is Log(Wealth)t - Log(Wealth)t−1
Method GMM
Log(Wealth)t−1 -0.025∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Before 2008 -0.001 -0.026 -0.045∗∗
(0.031) (0.017) (0.021)
Before 2008 × Self-made 0.037∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.020)
Before 2008 × Advanced 0.042∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.020)
GDP growth rate 4.186∗∗∗ 3.480∗∗∗ 3.300∗∗∗
(0.729) (0.269) (0.316)
Age -0.005
(0.004)
Age2 0.000
(0.000)
Constant 0.128 -0.047∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗
(0.134) (0.012) (0.015)
Inverse Mills Ratios Yes
Second-stage Dependent variable is residuals from the previous stage
Method GLS
Self-made 0.013∗∗ 0.006 -0.001
(0.006) (0.011) (0.014)
Advanced -0.002 -0.001 0.003
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013)
Constant 0.012 0.000 0.000
(0.011) (.) (.)
Sector-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3900 1947 1408
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Restricted Panel Forbes 300
(1) (2) (3) (4)
K-S K-S Mod. K-S K-S Mod.
Panel subset Completely Truncated 300 Partially Truncated 300
First-stage Dependent variable is Log(Wealth)t - Log(Wealth)t−1
Method GMM
Log(Wealth)t−1 -0.025∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Before 2008 -0.048∗∗∗ 0.026 -0.036∗∗∗ -0.014
(0.015) (0.037) (0.013) (0.026)
Before 2008 × Self-made 0.046∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Before 2008 × Advanced 0.036∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
GDP growth rate 3.786∗∗∗ 2.873∗∗∗ 3.702∗∗∗ 4.260∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.877) (0.226) (0.607)
Age -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.111 0.131 0.132 0.068
(0.136) (0.140) (0.127) (0.138)
Inverse Mills Ratios Yes Yes
Second-stage Dependent variable is residuals from the previous stage
Method GLS
Self-made 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Advanced 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -0.002 -0.002 0.011 0.011
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Sector-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2985 2985 3768 3768
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.4 Sectoral Results
In this section, we examine how our results change when we restrict attention to sector-specific
subsets of the overall Forbes 400. The entire group is spread across more than a dozen
sectors (Table 2), so the numbers are relatively small for individual sectors, and there are no
obvious cases for further combinations of sectors, beyond what we have done (Technology
and Telecom, Healthcare, and Medicine). Therefore, we estimate the model for just the three
most highly represented sectors, in terms of numbers of individuals. The results are reported
in Table 11.
In none of the three top sectors is there any statistically significant evidence of convergence,
since the coefficient of lagged wealth is statistically insignificant, even though it remains
negative. In the case of Finance, only the impact of being self-made remains significant,
although that is no longer true of any additional pre-2008 effect. The impact of the business
cycle, as captured by the coefficient of the GDP growth rate, is positive, but no longer
significant when the truncation correction is applied. For Technology and Telecom, the
pre-2008 effect of having an advanced degree remains significant, but the impact of GDP
growth changes sign when the truncation correction is applied. The case of Diversified
Investments, which is not really a sector in the sense of the others, but represents the best
description of the source of wealth of individuals in this category, has the most robust results
with respect to GDP growth and the pre-2008 impact of having an advanced degree, but the
other coefficients are no longer statistically significant.
At this stage, the best we can conclude from these sectoral results may be that wealth
dynamics differ across sectors, and additional disaggregated analysis would be helpful. To
perform such an analysis, a longer sample might be useful, by making it easier to disentangle
longer-term trends (such as might be overwhelming business cycle impacts for Technology
and Telecom in our results). On the other hand, longer samples would also introduce more
challenges in terms of assumptions of parameter stability.
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Table 11: Panel Estimation for Most Represented Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
K-S K-S Mod. K-S K-S Mod. K-S K-S Mod.
Sector Finance Tech. & Telecom Div. Invest.
First-stage Dependent variable is Log(Wealth)t - Log(Wealth)t−1
Method GMM
Log(Wealth)t−1 -0.008 -0.010 -0.015 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
Before 2008 0.019 -0.254 -0.076∗∗ 0.201∗ -0.015 -0.163
(0.058) (0.179) (0.033) (0.108) (0.039) (0.100)
Before 2008 × Self-made 0.074 0.063 0.005 0.011 0.039 0.047
(0.053) (0.054) (0.036) (0.033) (0.045) (0.045)
Before 2008 × Advanced -0.025 -0.024 0.072∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.032) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043)
GDP growth rate 2.187∗∗∗ 6.296 4.546∗∗∗ -2.590∗ 4.129∗∗∗ 7.305∗∗∗
(0.640) (5.061) (0.426) (1.482) (0.570) (2.295)
Age 0.002 0.009∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.013 0.004 0.015∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.010 -0.362 0.513∗∗ 0.561∗∗ -0.195 -0.675∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.276) (0.261) (0.275) (0.202) (0.203)
Inverse Mills Ratios Yes Yes Yes
Second-stage Dependent variable is residuals from the previous stage
Method GLS
Self-made 0.036∗ 0.037∗ 0.025 0.024 0.001 -0.003
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012)
Advanced -0.013 -0.015 -0.023∗ -0.018 0.008 0.007
(0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Sector-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 569 569 537 537 510 510
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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5 Conclusion
By analyzing a panel of 12 years of annual Forbes 400 data, spanning either side of the
financial crisis, we are able to observe some interesting characteristics of the dynamics of
membership in this group of the extremely wealthy. In particular, in the boom years leading
up to the financial crisis, there was greater mobility in this group, and increased entry by those
with advanced degrees and by those who could be characterized as “self-made”. Furthermore,
having an advanced degree and being self-made also contributed positively to the growth
of wealth in this boom period. We find evidence of business cycle effects in the growth of
wealth, which should not be surprising, but these are less clear when the analysis is restricted
to individuals in particular sectors of the economy. It is possible that other, longer-term
trends are being reflected in these differences across sectors.
For the average super-rich individual in the list, over the sample period, the growth rate
of wealth was slightly negatively related to the previous year’s wealth, after controlling for
various factors, implying a mild degree of conditional wealth convergence within the group.
While the rate of growth of wealth slowed after 2008, as would be expected, the growth rate
of wealth for this group was considerably higher than the GDP growth rate, by a factor of
about three. However, the rate of growth of wealth was higher for the self-made relative to
their counterparts both before and after 2008, although the lead narrowed after 2008. We
also found that the self-made were more likely to improve their ranking within the Forbes
400, conditional on staying in the list.
As noted, for the overall panel we found business cycle effects in terms of the relationship
between the GDP growth rate and the growth of wealth for the group, as well as positive
boom-year impacts of being self-made and having an advanced degree. However, these results
are not always robust to disaggregation by sectors, which suggests that wealth dynamics
are quite complex, partly as a result of different sectors having different sensitivity to the
business cycle, and partly due to the overlay of longer term trends on short term fluctuations.
In particular, the technology and telecom sector differs in these patterns from the finance
sector. On the other hand, the group whose wealth is in diversified investments displayed
wealth growth patterns more similar to the overall sample. We hope our analysis will point
the way to further investigation of these complex dynamics at the very top of the wealth
distribution. The dynamics of inequality and its interaction with the growth of non-dynastic,
self-made wealth also deserve further investigation over a longer time span.
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